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**Structure, culture, and intellectual style:
An essay comparing saxonic, teutonic, gallic
and nipponic approaches**

1. On intellectual styles in general

Dear reader — what you have in front of you is very much an *essay*. It is based on impressions and intuitions, written down on paper and in my memory during many years of travels and stays in various intellectual climates around the world. I myself come from a periphery country in what is still to a large extent the centre of the world, and I am no doubt marked by that. Having had the opportunity to work both in the fields of the methodology of sciences (Galtung 1967, 1977, 1979) and in substantive social science, particularly peace research (1975-80), development and future studies (1980), I have been struck repeatedly by how little awareness the members of one intellectual community seem to have of the peculiarities of their community. They are often good at

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characterizing others, but not themselves — this essay may prove not to be an exception to that rule. On earlier occasions I have tried to reflect on this trait in efforts to characterize the intellectual styles exhibited by many social scientists in Latin America (1979, chap. 5)¹ and in Germany (1979, chap. 8); the present essay is based on both efforts but expands the range of exploration. In all cases it should be emphasized that my remarks are limited to the field of social science. Some may also be valid for other sciences but that would be beyond any grasp I might possibly have of their substance.

Before trying to characterize any one intellectual style, let me first say something about “intellectual style” in general. What is it we intellectuals try to do? No doubt, we process impressions into expressions — the latter verbal, oral or written. For that reason freedom of impression is as important to us as freedom of expression: as we generally do not believe that we can draw everything from ourselves we have to have impressions, and we have to be able to express them as a part of our own pleasure and self-realization, and to enter into the networks of intellectuals in particular and the public in general, launching our intellectual products, searching for criticism as we say — and like all others we prefer in general the positive to the negative variety.² So we are conditioned by the impressions we receive and by our range of expression; in the current dominant philosophy of “truth” (presumably what we are trying to unravel), truth is more or less equated with the intersubjectively acceptable within a network of acceptable colleagues.³

But that is not all there is to it. Today it is probably generally agreed that the processing of impressions into expressions is conditioned by something. At the most general level it is the problem of how the human mind is constituted and how that will condition what comes out — it is sufficient to mention the work of Kant⁴ and Wittgenstein (1921, 1922). At the individual, personal level there is the notion of subjective elements, some of them to be handled intersubjectively like the famous observers’ equation for astronomers, some of them in a more qualitative manner as when we like to have information about a person’s background in order to better evaluate what he says because we would like to qualify it by some assumptions about why he says it.⁵

What I am interested in, however, is the level in between the individual and the universal. Broadly speaking, it is the civilizational or sub-civilizational — in other words macro-cultural — level. In

another essay this has been explored (Galtung, 1981) by contrasting occidental civilization (in what is referred to as the expansion and contraction phases respectively) with Hindu, Buddhist, Sinic and Nipponic civilizations in the Orient. In that connection the point is made that whereas the occidental, expansionist phase approach to epistemology seems to be in terms of an atomistic conception of reality combined with a deductive approach to understanding, in the Orient these two approaches mix and blend with a more holistic approach to reality and a more dialectic approach to understanding. Thus, the point is made that in the Occident, in extremis, the way of obtaining valid knowledge is by subdividing reality into a number of small parts, obtaining insights about a low number of them at a time, and then linking these insights together to form often highly impressive, deductive pyramids. This is then contrasted with efforts to conceive of reality as a totality with built-in contradictions, evolving over time.

The present essay is an attempt to be much more specific, staying at the level of macro-cultures, but below the level of civilizations, in sub-civilizations. More particularly, three occidental and one oriental sub-civilization form the subject matter of the inquiry: *saxonic*, *teutonic*, *gallic* and *nipponic* approaches, as stated in the subtitle. Why these strange terms?⁶ For the simple reason that they are not meant to be identified with Britain, Germany, France or Japan — these being actors in the international system, countries, and composed of various cultural strains. I do, however, see the styles to be characterized by these terms as rather dominant in the countries mentioned, although possibly more so in the past, even ten years ago, than today because of the high level of world interdependence and interaction, and subjugation to a general world intellectual style — to be described later. Incidentally, it is hoped that this type of exploration can be extended also to Indic, Sinic and Arabic approaches and to others.⁷

One reason for doing this is that it might be interesting to have a world map of intellectual styles. On that world map, in order now to be more specific, Oxbridge in England and key US universities on both the eastern and western seaboard would constitute the centre of the saxonic intellectual style; some of the smaller, classical universities in Germany (possibly Münster, Marburg, Heidelberg, Tübingen) might be seen as the centre of the teutonic intellectual style; there is no doubt as to where *the* centre of the gallic intellectual style is located; and the nipponic intellectual style would have

the Tōdai-Kyōdai (Tokyo and Kyoto universities) axis as its centre. Obviously all of this is ideal typical analysis in the Weberian sense, not to be taken literally as an empirical description. But as a first approximation it may nevertheless be useful.

One would then imagine a map with these centres as beacons directing intellectual activities in vast territories, viz., peripheries. The peripheries would, broadly speaking, include not only the rest of the countries mentioned, but also the intellectual activities in the colonial and neo-colonial empires. Thus, it is notable how the intellectual style changes from the saxon to the gallic and back again if one goes by car along the Gulf of Guinea in Africa: it is more than an exercise in changing from driving on the left to driving on the right to cross from a former British to a former French dependency. Obviously, liberation from intellectual style has not even been included in a programme of decolonization; one possible reason why liberation from other aspects of colonialism may not have been too efficient either.⁸

However, the gallic influence stretches far beyond *la communauté française*: it covers the whole Latin range of countries. As they say in South America, *Paris es la capital de la raza latina*. This would, incidentally, to a large extent include Romania. But otherwise it is my contention that Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, can be regarded as under the sway of the teutonic intellectual style, partly because of general cultural influence through centuries, partly because of the influence of a key teutonic thinker: Karl Marx. Finally Japan is its own centre; as in the case of other aspects of Japanese culture, it has no periphery beyond itself.

I shall let that do by way of introduction. It is a centre-periphery world so far equipped with only four centres of very different kinds. Most of the world is a periphery. But it raises an interesting question about a possible subdivision of that periphery:

- *under the influence of 0 centres*: intellectually marginalized territory, free to develop in any way;
- *under the influence of 1 centre*: a cultural periphery of that centre, an intellectual periphery bent on identification;
- *under the influence of 2 centres*: potentially benefiting from the cross-beaming influence, picking up the strong points of both;
- *under the influence of 3 centres or more*: possibly too overwhelming, too confusing, to elaborate anything new.

This calls for a more detailed analysis that will be carried out after the discussion of the four intellectual styles.

Having named the styles, how should one characterize them? For reasons of parsimony it seems reasonable to try to characterize them along the same dimensions although one may thus introduce a certain bias from the very beginning. In the idea of subdividing “intellectual activity” into four parts there is also an element of western atomization — no doubt it reflects on the author. Efforts will be made, however, later in the essay to try to look at these matters more holistically.

What is it that intellectuals do? I think it is fair to refer to their task as *descriptive* and *explanatory*; that is, describing what reality is like and trying to understand it.⁹ In the typical methodology textbook language it would be referred to as data collection, data processing and data analysis on the one hand, and theory formation on the other.¹⁰ As we know, either of these may condition the other.

But intellectual activity, of course, goes beyond this. There is the dimension of *paradigm analysis*, of looking into the foundations of what one does, of exploring the limitations of one’s own intellectual enterprise. One may say that this is, in a certain way, exactly what this essay is about. And here is one very simple little point: it is all too easy for each one of us to see the subjective limitations of any one particular colleague. We can see them because we can compare with other colleagues. Correspondingly, I think it is very difficult for us to come to grips with our limitations as human beings in a universal sense for the simple reason that we have nothing else to compare with, and as far as we know there is nobody else comparing us with themselves (as Koestler has remarked, there may perhaps be somebody but they may have such a dim view of us that they don’t care to communicate their findings to us — much like a biologist usually not bothering about how he can communicate findings about bacteria to the bacteria themselves!). But at the level of macro-cultures we can do this: there are contrasts, they can be communicated and understood, and translations are somewhere between the perfectly perfect and the perfectly imperfect.

Then, another example of what the present essay is about: all intellectuals are fascinated by other intellectuals and in fact devote much of their time to doing research on what others do. This type of commentary on other intellectuals can usefully be divided into the three sub-categories just developed: describing and explaining them (in the sense of understanding why their activity is the way it is), and exploring the paradigms for such understanding.

Of course, intellectuals often do more than this. They may be interested in communicating with others than their colleagues, in which case they engage in pedagogy and popularization. They may be interested in action based on their intellectual activity, in which case the research has an element of action research. A condition for the latter is probably that their conceptualization of reality goes beyond empirical reality to potential reality, including not only what is, but also what might be. In that case, theory formation would not only reproduce empirical reality but also state the circumstances under which potential reality might become empirical reality. A pragmatic dimension often enters at this point: potential reality is seen as worse or better than empirical reality, in other words as something to be avoided or to be pursued; and this is where action enters.¹¹ One might say that all of this adds a critical and pragmatic aspect to intellectual activity. However, it is my experience that this aspect is present or absent among intellectuals of all four styles; in other words it is not a characteristic distinguishing one from the other.

This leaves us with four dimensions along which to characterize, as a working hypothesis, four intellectual styles. As I have assumed that all four dimensions will have to be present to some extent in all cultures for the activity to be intellectual, *an intellectual style becomes a question of profile, of which dimension is strong, and which dimension is weak*. If we stick to that simple weak/strong split we get, of course, sixteen different styles out of which one is "ideal" in the sense of having all four dimensions well developed; and one is hardly an intellectual style at all since it is weak on all dimensions. But this simple exercise in combinatorics does not take us very far. It is the distinct quality, the tenor given to the dimensions within an intellectual style that counts. And that is the subject of the next section.

2. Saxonian, teutonic, gallic and nipponic styles: An effort at characterization

In Table 1 the reader will find summarized in a highly synoptic form what I am trying to say. However, all of this has to be spelt out and that will now be done in a more circular manner. In other words, this section will not be divided into four sub-sections, one for each intellectual style. Rather, I shall try to proceed by contrast,

TABLE 1
A guide to intellectual styles

	Saxonian	Teutonic	Gallic	Nipponic
Paradigm-analysis	weak	strong	strong	weak
<i>Descriptions:</i> Proposition-production	very strong	weak	weak	strong
<i>Explanations:</i> Theory-formation	weak	very strong	very strong	weak
<i>Commentary on other intellectuals:</i> — paradigms — propositions — theories	strong	strong	strong	very strong

by elucidating a point about one style with a point pertaining to another style. In doing so it is my hope that, at the end of the section, images of how these styles are conceived of will emerge.

In the table there are actually only two profiles, one shared by the saxonian and nipponic styles, and one by the teutonic and gallic styles. Moreover, all four styles appear to have one strong point in common: they are all rather good at commenting on other intellectuals. In stating this a simple point is made: the intellectual community is to some extent a closed community, feeding on itself in all societies. Many intellectuals receive as their major impressions what other intellectuals do and say. That is the reality to which they react, empirical reality as well as potential reality, and in the negative sense as their commentary will often be critical. But having said this one should also note that there are lots of differences, and this may be as good a point as any to enter the subject. In short, how is intellectual commentary — this rather incestuous and delightful activity — carried out in the four styles?

Broadly speaking, it is our contention that the saxonian style fosters and encourages *debate* and *discourse*. The general spirit is

that intellectuals constitute a team, that togetherness should be preserved, that there is a gentlemen's agreement to the effect that "we should stick together and continue our debate in spite of our differences", that pluralism is an overriding value, higher than the values attached to the individually or collectively held systems of belief. Seminars will tend to bring together people of different feather, the person "in the chair" will handle the debate in a parsimonious manner, and the first discussant will open his/her speech with the usual comment to the effect that: "I greatly enjoyed listening to Mr X's presentation, admiring his mastery of the facts of the case as well as his way of marshalling the facts together, but...". The "but" clause may then become quite extensive, with lots of cutting edges and biting points, but more likely than not there will be a complimentary, congratulatory point at the end.

Here one should perhaps mention the difference between the UK and the US versions of the saxon style. In my experience, in the UK, the "but" clause will tend to be several times longer than the complimentary introductory clause, whereas the opposite might be the case in the US, particularly as one moves west. The US professor at a graduate seminar would do his very best to find even in the most dismal performance that little nugget which, when polished, might produce a credible shine. He will tend to brush aside all the other things, go straight for it and bring it forth: "I really think you had a point there!" His UK colleague would be somewhat less generous. He would not brush aside all hopes, but he would make it very clear that the person presenting something is a defendant, in the dock, and that the burden of proof rests on him, not on the discussants. The US person will feel that he has the task of bringing about something positive; in Britain the opposite may be the case. But again, the differences aside, the general idea is that very different convictions should be brought together in a debate, be confronted with each other, and ultimately perhaps produce something which is more than the sum of the parts. The other person should be built up, not put down.

Not so in teutonic and gallic intellectual discussions. First, the dispersion or diversity of opinion in one single debate is likely to be smaller, the audience to be more homogeneous, and thus there will be less discrepancy to handle. Second, there will be no complimentary introduction even among friends, and certainly not if there is the slightest discrepancy of opinion. Third, nobody will go out of his or her way to try to find that little nugget, that little element of

hope on which to build — on the contrary, the discussants will go straight for the weakest point.¹² That weakest point will be fished out of the pond of words, brought into the clearest sunlight for display, so as to leave no doubt, and for dissection, which is done with considerable agility and talent. Probably most of the debate will be devoted to such aspects, and there will be few if any soothing comments towards the end to put the defendant together as a human being; no attempt will be made to mop up the blood and put wounded egos together. As opposed to the saxon exercise in humour and back-slapping on such an occasion, gazes would be somewhat cold, faces somewhat stiff, and a slight element of scorn and derision might emerge from the corners of the eyes. The paper-giving defendant would experience the situation as a victim. But since he knows this in advance, in order not to be victimized he might prefer to play it safe, be cagey, stick to the line from the beginning, offer some peremptory phrases designed to deflect hostile attention by uttering the correct magic words, by paying obedience to authorities and stratagems of that kind. The net result might certainly not be intellectually trivial but would have an element of subservience. The counterparts within the saxon setting might go more quickly to the point, the US players perhaps more audaciously than the others. But then it should also be mentioned that there is a price for audacity: *anything goes, everything is valuable*, one does not really have to think through one's ideas since there will be a sympathetic ear at the other end, eager to help — among other reasons because of a sense of collective responsibility as members of an "intellectual profession".

In the nipponic setting all of this is different. First, the Japanese are not very skilful at debating, they are not really trained in that direction. Second, whatever happens *the first rule would be not to harm pre-established social relations*. These are of two types.¹³ There is the general respect for authority, for the master wherever he is — the respect for verticality. And then there is the sense of collectivism, of organic solidarity: we are all one, essentially of the same kind, and whatever happens it should be possible for us to end up in the evening on the tatami-mat, drinking Sapporo beer or Suntory whisky, telling stories about similar meetings in other places. As to the latter point the Japanese are like their saxon colleagues, but without the same delight and talent for sharp intellectual discourse.

So, what happens during a Japanese intellectual debate? This is a

question not easily answered and particularly not by a *gaijin* (foreigner or stranger) because when a *gaijin* is present the atmosphere definitely changes. The basic point is that the intellectual commentary takes another form. It is not so much a question of exploring paradigms, questioning data bases and scrutinizing the adequacy of the inferences made in the theory formation. It is much more a question of classification: which school do you belong to? where did you get it from? who said it first? One might even say that it is the encyclopaedia/dictionary approach to intellectual commentary, the philological way of coming to grips with such matters: the social and personal biography. Also important would be an exploration of the perimeter of the person's intellectual attachments: what would be your view on this or that? Last year you said this, now you say that, how do the two hang together? Is what you said on subject matter X in any way related to what Mr B said on Y?

It is a mapping of intellectual territory, an exploration of border lines, and the general heading over this exercise would be one word: *school*, or in Japanese, with a particular connotation, *iemoto*. It goes without saying that any particular school might arouse strong emotions, but those emotions are generally concealed during the labelling exercise. The question is whether the person accepts the label, and once that has been established there is no need for any further comment. In fact, any further comment might destroy social relations. It is very much like the ubiquitous Japanese ritual of social introduction: two Japanese gentlemen, both dressed very well in conservative western clothes (black suits, white shirts, dark ties, dark socks, black shoes) approach each other, bow, utter words of greeting until both have achieved appropriate angles between the backs and the legs, whereupon their hands grasp the visiting-cards in their breast-pockets, pull them out and shared awareness of relative status is obtained after the exchange and a quick glance at the cards have taken place. *The debate is a social act rather than an intellectual one*. The classification into schools pre-empt the debate and makes for less disruption of social relations.

Nothing I have said should be taken to mean that there are no differences of opinion within the four intellectual cultures. The question is how these differences are handled. In the saxonian approach they come out in the open, there is a debate; in the US style, however, differences would tend to be glossed over more than in the UK, and more attempt would be made to bring about a sense of

consensus at the end. There will be jubilation if any kind of "convergence" occurs. A person willing to emit signals to the effect that he has changed opinion in the course of the debate will receive some laurels for this. He certainly would not in teutonic and gallic cultures: there are differences of opinion, mature people have theirs and opinions are in no sense of equal standing. It is simply "I am right, you are wrong" — or something close to it. Saxonian colleagues might have a somewhat similar opinion of their own opinion, but there would be this difference: the debate is seen as a source of delight, even across a considerable distance in the spectrum. Teutons and gauls also love debate, but not with antagonists too far from their own point of view — to engage in a debate then would be considered hopeless or an act of condescension, a waste of time. (One does not debate with semi-humans, primitives, or barbarians.) And what has been said about debates also applies to journals, magazines, and reviews: possibly this is the reason why in the US *the* professional review (usually called *American X Review*; for X insert any social science discipline) is a very thick affair embracing the whole profession, whereas in other intellectual cultures it is a more modest thing. The price the US pays for becoming ecumenical is perhaps a certain blandness; other cultures are more sectarian and have a less distinct national character except precisely that of sectarianism.

Taking all of this as a point of departure let me move to the second row of Table 1: how is the description of reality handled in the four styles? The basic contention is, of course, that the saxonian style is very strong in this particular regard. The British penchant for documentation is proverbial, as is the US love of statistics.¹⁴ To have thoroughly scrutinized all sources, to have put all the data together, concealing nothing, is a key criterion of scholarship. This is by no means easy, it is a craft. But as a craft it has a particular characteristic: faiths and beliefs enter into it to a lesser extent than into other intellectual pursuits. One can be for or against a theory; one may like or dislike a fact, but one cannot be for or against it in the same way. Perhaps one might go one step further and simply say: *data unite, theories divide*. There are clear, relatively explicit canons for establishing what constitutes a valid fact and what does not; the corresponding canons in connection with theories are more vague. Few things would so improve the gentlemen's debate, hailed as a superior form of human intercourse in the saxonian exercise, as *data*. And few things would help as much to produce strong divi-

sions — people with firm commitments — as *theories* in the teutonic and gallic intellectual approaches.

One might now complete the picture of the saxon intellectual style by emphasizing its weak points: not very strong on theory formation, and not that strong on paradigm awareness. This is not to say that Britain, in particular, has not produced (as opposed to imported) philosophers of science of the highest quality. But somehow it is not so obvious that they relate directly to the scientific enterprise. In a sense they belong more to another craft apart from it, on the side. British historians and British anthropologists are known and respected for their tremendous skill and energy in producing an astounding variety of detail, of data of all kinds — some of which is extremely hard to get at. They are certainly not known for sweeping theories, for grand perspectives, for having projected the type of light that makes vast areas look bright but at the expense of all the nuances, the shadows in the crevices and the canyons of doubt and so on. One could even surmise that an average saxon researcher would fall prey to vertigo if a theoretical pyramid rose five centimeters above the ground. . . . The highest he would venture would be to Merton's proverbial "theories of the middle-range":¹⁵ a set of small pyramids gathered in the landscape with no super-pyramid overarching them except the basic tenets of saxon intellectual culture in its ideographic (UK) and nomothetic (US) varieties.¹⁶

How can all this be justified? There can be no reference to particular sources, it is all part of the general culture. The historian simply *knows* that he is against "sweeping generalizations", so does the anthropologist. Probing into the matter will not bring out very interesting answers. Because of this kind of unawareness the teutonic or gallic intellectual might not even realize that he is somewhat short on documentation to back up what he is saying. To him intellectual activity has at its very centre theory-formation. The function of data would be to illustrate rather than to demonstrate. A discrepancy between theory and data would be handled at the expense of the data: they may either be seen as atypical or wholly erroneous, or more significantly as not really pertinent to the theory. And here the distinction between empirical and potential reality comes in: to the teutonic and gallic intellectual, potential reality may be not so much the reality to be even more avoided or even more pursued than the empirical one but rather *a more real reality*, reality free from the noise and impurities of empirical reality.

Theories refer to that reality, mathematical economics perhaps being a case in point. To this it can be objected that few people are in fact so strong in mathematical economics as UK and US economists — a fact readily admitted. But the answer might also be that in this respect, they are not really saxon. They are in fact addressing themselves to a potential reality which has some, usually not very explicit relationship to reality as known by people in general — and are selecting the data to fit this reality.¹⁷

Theory-formation is the stringing-together-of-words, with occasional anchoring in a data base. Few would dispute that teutonic and gallic intellectuals can be masters at this. But having remarked on this common trait one must clearly point to the tremendous differences existing between them as to how they proceed.

It can probably be maintained that teutonic theory-formation is above all purely deductive. It is guided by the basic idea of *Gedankennotwendigkeit*: if one has accepted the premises and certain rules of inference, then the conclusion follows. The goal is to arrive from a small number of premises at a high number of conclusions covering as vast an area of inquiry as possible. Basic to all this is the logical relation of *implication*: $p \rightarrow q$, which permits all kinds of relations between p and q , *except* the idea that p (premises) could be false and at the same time q (conclusion) could be true. When one says "if p , then q " and in addition one says " p is true, that is what my research has shown me (whether empirical or non-empirical)" then, by *modus ponens* the conclusion cannot fail to be " q is true". Deductive theory-formation is based on this, at least in principle. The teutons are masters at building such pyramids. Mathematics is based on this, so mathematization *may* tend to bias the intellectual towards the teutonic style.¹⁸

Why this excursion into elementary logic? Simply to show one thing: theory formation is based on strong and strict dichotomies, and is highly unambiguous. Data may confirm a hypothesis only up to a certain point, but if it is 100 percent one may even suspect that the hypothesis is a tautology. In other words, there is room for a certain ambiguity. Not so with the implication relation and hence with theory formation: once one has accepted the premises one cannot but accept the conclusions. In other words, one becomes a prisoner of premises and of the deductive framework in which they are embedded. If one wants a conceptualization of the universe or a part of it as fundamentally orderly, whether one thinks that that order emerges from reality itself or is something that one imposes

upon reality (or both) there is no objection to this approach. But if at a deeper level one is attracted by ambiguities either because one does not want to be a prisoner of one's own thoughts or because one feels the universe itself is ambiguous, then deductive theory-formation based on Aristotelian logic may become a nuisance, and even a dangerous one. It puts reality in a strait jacket.

There are at least three responses to this problem. The first is the approach taken within the gallic intellectual style, the second the approach taken within the nipponic intellectual style. And the third, very simply put, is as follows: you can enjoy fully the delight of the deductive exercise without in any sense assuming that the "truth" of propositions in the pyramidal network is also an empirical truth. It may simply be a postulated truth, and the rest is a game. The name of that game is formal logic; the most important branch of the tree of formal logic is mathematics. As is well known there are superb mathematicians within all four intellectual cultures.

The argument to be developed now is that the gallic (and later on the nipponic) approach to theory formation is very different from the teutonic. More particularly, I think the gallic approach is certainly a stringing-together-of-words, but not necessarily deductively. The words connote something, they carry conviction. As a matter of fact they may carry even more conviction than a teutonic pyramid of tightly interlocking units. But it may be that this power of conviction is due less to logical structure than to a certain artistic quality that gallic social-science prose very often possesses, particularly when spoken and written by its true masters. Persuasion is carried, perhaps, less by implication than by *élégance*. Behind the *élégance* is not only the mastery of good style as opposed to the dryness of German social-science prose, often bordering on drabness, but also the use of bons mots, double entendres, alliterations and various types of semantic and even typographical tricks. The *reversal of sentences* is one of these: if an article starts with the assumption that the egg is the way in which a hen produces another hen it must end with the assumption (not consequence!) that the hen is the way in which an egg produces another egg. Similarly, the poverty of philosophy will become the philosophy of poverty towards the end of an essay. Typographically this can become even more clear by seeing to it that there is some kind of correspondence between the first and last word on the printed page. The aesthetic aspect — balance, symmetry — matters.¹⁹

What I am trying to say is that there may be some underlying figure of thought that is directing much of the theory-forming exercise. It has been indicated above many times that for the teutonic intellectual style this is the *pyramid*, perhaps the steeper the better, even with a basic "contradiction" on top. Thus, the contradictions between labour and capital for Marx, between Id and Super-ego for Freud and between Aryans and Jews for Hitler were such key principles, perspectives, axioms from which an enormous number of conclusions were more or less rigorously deduced. The basic postulate for all three was that the contradiction had to be overcome for the system to "mature", by labour controlling capital in a mature socialist society, by Super-ego and Id producing an Ego in balanced command of either, and by the Aryans overcoming the Jews, by expelling and exterminating them. From one basic principle very many conclusions were drawn, some of them highly dramatic.

Not so in the gallic intellectual style. If I should guess at a corresponding underlying figure of thought it would be a *hammock*: two pylons and between them the hammock suspended. The body comes to rest when the stringing-together-of-words is suspended between two opposed poles, with a tension, but a balanced tension. Opposed is not the same as opposite, maybe "counterpoised" would be a better expression. There is a totality to things, a balance rather than a centre, and a summit, as the pyramid metaphor for the teutonic style indicates. But the totality cannot be shown through rigorous deduction. It has to be hinted at, one has to dance around it and view it from many angles until in the end it rests suspended between the two poles.²⁰

Both the teutonic and the gallic exercises in theory formation require a verbal ability mastered only by the few. I would even venture the hypothesis that it is more difficult to build rigorously a solid teutonic pyramid or balance artistically a well-suspended gallic hammock than to mobilize all the craftsmanship necessary to document a proposition within the saxonic style. And this tallies well with what was said above about the styles of intellectual discourse. The teutonic and gallic types of intellectual intercourse are highly Darwinian struggles where only the fittest survive, hardened, and able to dictate the terms for the next struggle. The saxonic, US more than UK, and the nipponic exercises are more tolerant, more democratic, less élitist. Certainly this relates to the circumstance that both the USA and Japan are countries of mass

education even at the tertiary level and for that reason have to admit more people to the arena of intellectual discourse (or conversely, because they admit more people they can become countries with mass education even at the tertiary level).²¹

In both the teutonic and gallic cases it is a question not only of not putting one's foot wrong, but also of seeking to step into new territory. The sense of what is correct within each intellectual style has to be very sharp indeed. In the teutonic case one aims for rigour, if necessary at the expense of elegance; in the gallic case the goal is elegance, perhaps at the expense of rigour in the teutonic sense. The stand taken here is, of course, that neither is right nor wrong; they are simply two different approaches to the intellectual enterprise. And of the two the gallic is probably the more *élitist*: the true *maître* has to master what saxon, teutonic and nipponic intellectuals master *and in addition be an artist*; thus a structure for the intellectual community is created which is isomorphic to the structure of the French civil service!²²

Where, then, does the nipponic approach to theory formation fit into this? At first glance one might say that perhaps there is not much theory formation in the nipponic intellectual style, or not much more than is found in saxon thinking. Theories take a stand, they not only say that certain things are like this rather than that, they chain together a lot of things in a framework of the valid, and whatever remains outside the framework is easily seen as invalid (note the double meaning of this word). The lack of ambiguity, the clarity of the teutonically shaped theory is incompatible with basic Hindu, Buddhist and Daoist approaches. These eastern approaches all militate against the atomism and the deductive rigidity of the western exercises in general and the teutonic one in particular. Take for instance the Hindu insistence on the *inseparability* of basic elements (you cannot realize — including comprehend — one element without realizing or comprehending the others);²³ the Buddhist insistence on the circularity of reasoning (a sentence and its converse together comprise a much better approach to truth than one of the sentences alone: "I drive the car" counterpoised with "The car drives me" gives a truer picture of the situation — a point with which one might readily agree);²⁴ and the Daoist focus on a very moving dialectic. One must also take into account the countless ambiguities in Japanese (cf., Galtung and Nishimura, 1981) which are eminently compatible with these elements of Hindu and oriental thinking but much less compatible with deductive

theory formation. However, if a Japanese scholar feels uneasy with an elegant western theory he may not be able to identify the source of his uneasiness and may try to attack the theory on its own grounds, that the premises and/or conclusions are simply not empirically tenable, for instance. The occidental protagonist of the theory may be surprised because such arguments simply do not hold water and he will be unable to understand the real source of the objections.

Many strands come together at this point. First, the Japanese rarely pronounce absolute, categorical statements in daily discourse; they prefer vagueness even about trivial matters (they would rather not say: "the train is leaving at twelve o'clock") because clear statements have a ring of immodesty, of being judgments of reality. To say "this is my theory" and then go ahead to expound it would be immodesty writ large, a highly un-Japanese attitude. What one might do would be to proceed to intellectual commentary, saying "there is such a theory" and then describe it as somebody else's, perhaps placing it on the intellectual map without necessarily adding any confession certificate. This will sound very unsatisfactory to the occidental mind that wants to know whether the person is a protagonist or an antagonist, and what the stand taken is, so that he can confront the person, not an abstract theory.

But at a deeper level I think the fear of unambiguity is more important. Just as the occidental mind seems to have a fear of inconsistency, ambiguity, contradiction, and strives to obtain images that are contradiction free,²⁵ the oriental mind strives for the opposite and not necessarily for any linguistic reason, but simply because the underlying cosmology contains very different visions of how real reality is constituted. This does not at all mean that theory formation is impossible, but it calls for more holistic, dialectical approaches. These are informed by ancient wisdom of the Hindu/Buddhist/Daoist varieties (not so much Confucian or Shinto) and are hence couched in expressions that might sound quaint, particularly to occidental ears. What also seems clear is that so far no one has been truly able to bring about a synthesis of "modern" scientific insights and "traditional" forms of understanding. The search is perhaps going on (see e.g. Mushakoji, 1979), but to the extent that the results are still tentative, the discourse produced does not sound like theory formation to the occidentally trained ear or eye but like verbiage. It may be dubbed "wisdom", but that is not necessarily a positive epithet.

Hence, my conclusion is that the nipponic approach to this dilemma will result in: (a) little or no theory at all being developed, or only very cautiously elaborated, with all kinds of excuses and apologies; (b) something closer to a theory being put forward, but (expressed) in non-occidental terms not easily reconciled with the occidental aspects of Japanese intellectual activity; and (c) the Japanese mind turning more and more to mathematics. There are many first-rate mathematicians in Japan, but so far the Japanese contribution to social science theory-formation, including such fields as peace studies, development studies and future studies, is indeed negligible.²⁶

Let us then approach the problem of theory formation from another angle, based more on some conceptions of social structure in the four types of societies we are concerned with. The basic hypothesis is very simple: there has to be some kind of correspondence between general social structures and the structure of the scientific community, and there also has to be some kind of correspondence between the structure of the scientific community and the structure of the scientific product, that is the mixture of paradigm analysis/proposition production/theory formation/commentary ultimately produced. (For a further exploration, see Galtung, 1977, chap. 1.) What assumptions could one have about the structure of the scientific community?

In Germany the structure seems by and large to be very pyramidal. There was a tremendous respect for the *Professor*, the respect was not pretended but real, and his relationship to the lesser fry of assistants and students was that of master to disciple. The steepness of the scientific community structure corresponds well with the steepness of the theory pyramid: the higher the professor is located the deeper or more abstract the fundamental principles on which he is working; the lower he is located the lower the level of propositions until one comes down to students, the foot soldiers of research who dirty their hands with empirical matters. In all of this one may perhaps see the university community as lagging behind changes that have after all taken place in Germany, particularly in Germany under social democracy, from the feudal days lasting well into the nineteenth and even the twentieth century.

But is France not the same type of country? It is certainly élitist in the sense that the scientific community is an élite in French society. But I doubt very much that one can talk about master-disciple relations in France in the same way as one can for Germany. In

Germany people may be proud of being disciples, they may be referred to and refer to themselves as followers of *Meister* so on so. I have almost never heard this in France: there, it sounds rather as if everybody conceives of himself as a master, or a master *in statu nascendi*. One might be working in somebody's department or laboratory, but that is a temporary and necessary insult to the human mind and dignity, soon to be overcome. After that the final synthesis of Marx and Freud will be written. . . . A scientific community of masters, each with his own inimitable, highly individualistic style, each very often working at home, unencumbered by the kind of institute to which the German professors are ultimately succumbing, almost as frustrated at not having sufficient scientific or administrative assistance as the German masters are at being bogged down by administrative duties, filling in a considerable number of forms in order to comply with bureaucratic exigencies.

Why is it that German institutes seem to be bigger than the French, that the latter tend to divide and subdivide until they consist of one-and-a-half persons working at home? Possibly because the outside structure calls for an even higher level of competitiveness, possibly because individualism as a basic characteristic is even more pronounced, possibly because traits such as verticality and a certain authoritarian submissiveness (and authoritarian dominance of others) are not symmetrically distributed between the two countries. I do not know, but as a consequence it looks as if the scientific idea of truth as that which is intersubjectively communicable and reproducible needs to be modified considerably due to cultural differences. Is this a saxonic prejudice?

More concretely, in Germany intersubjectivity is obtained within a school of thought, within a master-disciple pyramidal relationship. What this means is essentially that the disciples arrive at understanding the master and in so doing accept his theory without fundamentally challenging it. Or, if somebody challenges it he takes upon himself the whole burden of proof of establishing himself as a new master, above or alongside the old one — a herculean task. Intersubjectivity between two pyramids is not asked for, the theoretical constructions are incomparable and their adherents celebrate their incomparability by issuing solid certificates to each other to the effect that the other one is not only wrong, but fundamentally wrong.²⁷

In France I doubt that there is more horizontal intersubjectivity

to substitute for the lack of a vertical one. There is admiration for the power of conviction, verbal display, clear light emanating from the luminaries. But there will never be full communication, if for no other reason than that each master has his own language. An effort by somebody else to try to communicate back that he has received the message will be firmly rejected as an infringement on the personal integrity of the master: "you have not understood me correctly, I did not say. . .". Efforts to demonstrate reproducibility will be put down as attempts at plagiarism, as lack of originality on both sides.

But this does not mean that there is not some kind of intersubjectivity at a higher level. *There may be a sharing of the gallic intellectual style as such*, of the conviction that this is the way to build a theory and that lesser human beings will never be able to do it, as proven by the fact that they don't do it. There could be nodding approval, often well concealed, for the fact that Monsieur so-and-so has arrived at the appropriate style, even if one thinks what he tries to communicate is pure nonsense. A German professor out to see whether he can give a "certificate" to one of his disciples for some higher title, will meticulously scrutinize the pyramid section the disciple has presented as his thesis for possible holes in the reasoning. The French professor might prefer an oral dialogue to see whether the *candidat* has come to the level of being able to fend for himself. It could very well be a *dialogue de sourds* as it does not serve the purpose of communication as much as the purpose of testing the pattern of verbal behaviour in general. The idea of an intellectual seminar as a setting for mutual aid — "I'll help you today, maybe you'll help me tomorrow" — is a setting between equals in a community. This reflects the basic saxonian assumption, "we are all élites in the British society, certified craftsmen with some differences in skill but not so much that we cannot relate relatively horizontally to each other." But it is incompatible with the vertical German relationship where the master has to pretend that he has nothing to learn. And it is also incompatible with the fragmented French relation where so many people seem to pretend that they are irrelevant to each other, however much they share, or precisely *because* they share, the same intellectual style. In that setting people at the top may even become totally inaccessible to challenge and debate for fear of *lèse majesté*.

But what about Japan, is that not a fundamentally vertical, collectivistic society? Is not the Japanese social atom the human

group, built around organic solidarity, with a leader, very compatible with the master-disciple image given for the German setting? It certainly is, and one would imagine that in Japan there would be many small pyramids of an intellectual style not so different from the teutonic one. Within those pyramids theory formation could emerge, social relations within would become stronger and social relations without might be unnecessary. But it is this latter point that is problematic: since the second world war the all-Japan associations for science X and science Y have become so important that they have probably served to level down many of the smaller *iemoto* and have thus come to produce a certain all-Japanese flatness.²⁸ A general Japanese collectivism could perhaps only be obtained by sacrificing some of the verticality, and in the horizontality that has ensued, Japanese intellectual activity has, perhaps, been forced into proposition production rather than theory formation — for the many reasons mentioned above.

Some words about *paradigm analysis*. As presented in Table 1, strength in paradigm analysis goes together with strength in theory formation. I think there is something to this: one is related to the other, they derive from the same basic abilities, verbal analysis, and can be relatively detached from too strong confrontations with empirical reality. Paradigm analysis and theorizing are as omnipresent in the teutonic and gallic exercises, as they are mostly absent from saxonian (particularly US)²⁹ and nipponic intellectual activity. In this, there is also no doubt another key to the explanation of the nipponic intellectual style of today (if my observations are near the real situation): Japan is located in the periphery of saxonian, particularly US intellectual culture, certainly not least in the social sciences. This would seem opposed to the traditional interest of the Japanese in Confucian studies (more based on impressive theory formation or "stringing-together-of-words"), and in German jurisprudence, also highly deductive in its construction. And that brings us to a point in need of much more elaboration: if Japan is gradually liberating itself from US tutelage and dominance in military and political affairs, as she has already done in economic affairs, will the intellectual style follow suit? Will something less similar to the saxonian style emerge?

I mention this because it may yield a more civilizational, less political interpretation to what happened in Germany at the end of the 1960s. There was a tremendous resurgence of Marxist thinking, and a corresponding attack on "positivism", "functionalism",





and also on empiricism in the social sciences in general (except the type of empirical studies that were expected to give unambiguous support to the theses of the type of Marxist thinking that emerged).³⁰ Could this also have been a teutonic wave of protest against the saxonic penetration brought about particularly by US social science? Waves of Fulbright scholars in both directions, countless exchanges, US empirical social-science techniques penetrating far into the German heartland — was it not inevitable that this should lead to some type of resistance? Could it be, perhaps, that a part of the Marxist resurgence was German nationalism? And if that is the case would it not merit support not only or necessarily because of its political connotations but also because its implication was a higher level of diversity in intellectual styles? For those who see the saxonic style as the world style, as the intellectual culture underlying an emerging world civilization with a world government and so on, this would be a step backward. For others who view the world differently it might be seen in a different vein; e.g. as a movement of independence.

Let me try to summarize what I have said by putting down in the shortest possible form the typical question put in the four intellectual styles when somebody is faced with a proposition:

- saxonic style: *how do you operationalize it?* (US version)
how do you document it? (UK version)
- teutonic style: *wie können Sie das zurückführen — ableiten?*
(how can you trace this back — deduce it from basic principles?)
- gallic style: *peut-on dire cela en bon français?*
(is it possible to say this in French?)
- nipponic style: *donatano monka desuka?*
(who is your master?)

Another way of summarizing might be by way of Table 2:

TABLE 2
Four styles, four figures of thought

	<i>Non-dialectical</i>	<i>Dialectical</i>
<i>Proposition-oriented</i>	saxonic 	nipponic 
<i>Theory-oriented</i>	teutonic 	gallic 

The figures should certainly not be taken too seriously. But they do contrast the very small saxonic pyramids, built on solid empirical ground, the gigantic teutonic pyramidal constructions covering so much, the dialectical tension in the gallic form of presentation and the vague attempts at chaining data together in what might become an emerging nipponic style based on the Buddhist wheel: the quadrants of the table are presented in the order in which the styles appeared in Table 1 above. The figures may be useful in reminding one of some points mentioned above, but which are perhaps not developed as much as they deserve.³¹

Thus, saxonic and nipponic intellectual styles would be fact-oriented which would mean that the education system should place a great deal of emphasis on collection of facts. Correspondingly, German schools would be more oriented towards memorizing ways of thinking and French schools towards mastery of the French language, how to speak and write it not only correctly but elegantly, learning from the great masters of gallic style.

Second, the teutonic style is the only one that has a clear centre or summit. About the gallic style one can say what is sometimes said about French presentation: *on ne sait pas où est le commencement et où est la fin*. I am not thinking of the vulgar, simplistic type

of presentation that is often referred to as “logical” and “Cartesian”: “the human body has (a) arms, (b) legs; the arms are divided into (1) the right arm, (2) the left arm.” That kind of talk is what I would rather refer to as administrative/bureaucratic talk, perhaps the talk of the intelligentsia, but not the style of intellectuals.³²

But that brings up an important point in the teutonic style: the tremendous intellectual risk taken. There is so much at stake! If something should be shown to be invalid — a proposition being falsified, a sentence however arrived at being unacceptable for whatever reasons — there is no major catastrophe in the other three styles. The saxon intellectual will only have, at most, one pyramid destroyed and can start constructing one more little pyramid out of the debris. The nipponic intellectual has, if anything at all, a highly flexible wheel, which turns through various facts. The gallic intellectual will usually be able to hide the difficulty behind one more elegant formulation, sufficiently ambiguous, perhaps slightly pompous, but nevertheless worthy of certificate “votre presentation magistrale” at the end. But the pure teutonic intellectual is not in that situation: he may risk seeing his whole pyramid fall to pieces. Hence, it is no wonder that he approaches the work with a certain inner nervousness expressed as muscular tension and with no visible reserve of humour in his countenance. No anecdote, no analogy, no euphony, no double entendre can hide the disaster that can hit a teutonic pyramid; with it may fall a lifetime of intellectual investment.³³

In addition to this difference between the teutonic and the gallic intellectual comes a final difference not explicitly mentioned above: it is my contention that the teutonic intellectual simply *believes* what he says, something his gallic counterpart would never really do. The teutonic intellectual might even come to the point where he believes that his pyramid is a good model of empirical reality and act accordingly: he may believe that empirical consequences will follow as readily when the key truth of the system is changed, in the same way as the logical consequences followed from his rigorous logical deductions. I think the gallic intellectual would be more prone to consider his model as a metaphor, shedding some light on reality but not to be taken too seriously, and then on the side engage in rather saxon and very hard empirical work (the teutonic colleague may also do that, but always with the idea of trying to prove his pyramid right). And thus ends the story: the teutonic in-

tellectual may become an extremist to the left or to the right as the case may be because he takes his own theory seriously;³⁴ the gallic intellectual may prefer a good lunch, with beautifully ornamented conversation as an accompaniment to a splendid French meal.

3. Diversity in intellectual styles: some conditions and consequences

Most readers will have recognized some elements in the points explored above, nodded inwardly in agreement with some of them, or shaken by the superficiality and lack of evidence, been strongly opposed to some points made. For that reason everybody should look with scepticism at what I am now trying to do: to make the whole image more plausible by spinning the four descriptions more tightly into a web of conditions and consequences — certainly not in any clear-cut deductive framework, but in some kind of mixture of saxon, teutonic, gallic and nipponic approaches to the phenomenon I am trying to explore.

To start at some point: I have mentioned a number of cultural and structural phenomena conditioning, if not unambiguously, the intellectual styles above. Maybe they could be looked at once more to see whether still some insights can be gleaned from them.

Intellectual activity is primarily verbal activity, it is couched in a language. Between natural and artificial languages there is a continuum — mathematics being perhaps at the extreme of the artificial end — with various levels of technical jargon locating a scientific language somewhere in-between — both in terms of incomprehensibility for the outsider and unambiguity for the insider. In another connection I have tried to explore how languages can be carriers of a certain social cosmology (see Galtung and Nishimura, 1981), and there seems to be little doubt that the German language is as well fitted for the teutonic intellectual style as the Japanese language for the nipponic style. Thus, the German sentence certainly has a beginning and an end, it is unilinear, unidirectional; a Japanese sentence can be turned around very many ways and still retain some of its meanings although new nuances may come out each time. Maybe English and French are somewhere in-between, certainly closer to German as they are closely related languages within the Indo-European language family. I mention this only because it might bring out a way of exploring other intellectual

styles, relating indic style to Hindi, arabic style to Arabic and sinic style to Chinese — at least as a point of departure.

But then there is also another way of approaching this: the distinction between *élite language* and *popular language*. Is there a class difference in language that also corresponds to the class difference in intellectual style of presentation? Maybe there is: in that upper-class Germans speak a much more rigorous and complicated German reflected in their intellectual style, upper-class French speak a much more artistic and elegant French reflected in their intellectual style, upper-class British speak more correctly (but English grammar is not that complicated, what is complicated is mainly the spelling), but above all a language much richer in vocabulary and nuances, much more capable of capturing detail and, that upper-class Japanese speak an even more ambiguous, complicated and socially conscious Japanese. And that points to something not sufficiently mentioned above — *the class character of the intellectual style*. All the diversity pointed to in the preceding section may be real among intellectual élites or those designated as intellectual élites, yet there may be a similarity among peoples. But even if this is the case one should not underestimate the sway that élites have over people, how they train the people in admiring the style they themselves are masters of, and how the people tend to follow suit. The four questions asked at the end of the preceding section in an effort to epitomize the differences are asked not only by university trained intellectuals, but also by the “man in the street” in the four cultures.³⁵

Deeper than this is the culturally defined notion of truth. Maybe the key distinction here is whether truth is seen as something permanent although difficult to approximate, to reveal, to unravel; or as something fleeting, floating because reality itself is fleeting and floating. This is not a question of *Substanzbegriff* vs. *Funktionsbegriff*; the latter concept of truth would deny even functional invariances, whereas the former concept is compatible with them. Obviously, deductive frameworks, particularly when the pyramids are huge and for that reason difficult to de-construct because of the intellectual investment in them, are better suited to the first type of truth; dialectical forms of understanding better suited to the latter. The former puts reality in a strait jacket; the latter is supposed to adjust as reality changes shape and substance. If the former is too rigid the danger always persists that the latter is too flexible.

At this point, however, one might also turn to class analysis, to

more structural perspectives. In whose interest is it to have a rigid vs. flexible view of social reality (we are dealing with social sciences here)? The most simplistic answer would be that the dominant would prefer truth to be stable as the present social truth is one that pleases them; the dominated would prefer it to be flexible as only that would give hope for the future. If one applies this thinking to countries it would lead to the interesting hypothesis that their conceptualization of truth would change with their position in the world; as they range from top-dog, status quo countries to under-dog countries yearning for change, the intellectual style should also undergo changes. The question may be asked: was teutonic intellectual culture more dialectic when Germany played a much more modest role in the world? — or does one have to go so far back in time that the question becomes meaningless? What about France, was the French intellectual culture more deductive (like the one we attempted to ridicule above) when France was more at the peak of its *gloire*? What about Japan? As the rising sun continues to rise will the Japanese intellectuals develop more of a sense of grand theories freezing a pleasant reality and be less concerned with fleeting images of a floating reality? As the British continue on their way “down the drain”, will their world views become more dialectic? I do not know the answers, but find the questions worth asking.

Much has been made in the preceding section of three variables characterizing social structures: verticality/horizontality, collectivism/individualism and polarization/integration. Thus, a scientific community that is vertical, individualist and polarized should produce an intellectual style like the teutonic one; if it is more horizontal but individualist and polarized it should come out more like the gallic intellectual style; if it is horizontal, individualist but much less polarized something like the saxonic culture would be expected, emphasizing the aspects of intellectual activity that would facilitate regulated participatory discussion among equals. And finally if the structure is vertical, collectivist and non-polarized like the Japanese one should expect the nipponic style to emerge: due respect for authority, but no undue emphasis on the contentious issues brought into the discourse through theories with sharp edges. If, however, the intellectual community is vertical, collectivist and polarized then something more similar to the teutonic style could emerge: each school producing its deductive pyramid, with the key to the pyramid vested in the master of the school, and perhaps even

more explicitly so than in Germany. On the other hand, it is also difficult to beat teutonic culture at this: after all it is an important aspect of teutonic culture that schools of thought are named after their teutonic founders, such as Marxism, Freudianism (one might also have talked about Hitlerianism, but that word has never caught on as Hitler was never regarded as an intellectual!).

This leaves us with three more possibilities that might give some insights. Thus, what about the two versions combining horizontalism and collectivism in the scientific community, the polarized and non-polarized versions? This would have to be some kind of highly horizontal scientific commune rather than just a community engaged in scientific production. In order to remain horizontal it would have to refrain from division of labour by having some people working higher up and others working lower down in deductive pyramids; very pyramidal theory-formation would probably be out, as it seems sooner or later to lead to precisely that type of division of labour. More likely than not it would produce insights couched in terms of proposition production rather than theory formation, tilting more in the direction of saxonic and nipponic approaches. If these communities were polarized they would produce disparate images, but not necessarily antagonistic ones — they could simply be mutually irrelevant to each other, reflecting different cognitive cultures. Intellectual zen monasteries neighbouring on each other but with a low level of interaction?

And then there is the vertical, individualist and non-polarized: the teutonic style writ large covering the whole world! Interestingly enough this nightmare is in fact what is written into the hidden methodology of most methodology books: individual brilliance in fierce competition ultimately resulting in a *unified theory*¹⁶ unexposed to any competition as it covers the whole world, *universalism*! One might put it this way: the teutonic style is tolerable when it is encased in a pluralistic setting; take away that setting and it becomes intolerable.

And this leads straight to a type of analysis hinted at but not explored above: how do these different styles relate to problems of freedom vs. repression? Put differently, what kind of intellectual would repressive régimes be afraid of? Would they be more afraid of the proposition gatherer or of the theoretician, the person who collects data without theory or the person who produces theory without data? One hypothesis might be as follows: they are afraid of neither. The person who just collects data without imbuing it

with too much meaning becomes like a stamp collector, busily at work with his data collection. And a person who collects meaning without relating it to concrete facts becomes something equally innocent. What a repressive régime would be afraid of would be the person who does both, collects data and tries to give meaning to them in the light of some theory; produces theories and tries to test them by means of some data.

If there is something to that hypothesis it leads to two interesting conclusions. First, the intellectual cultures defined in the simplistic description of Table 1 all show important imbalances: they are either proposition-oriented or theory-oriented; none of them exhibits a good balance between the two. Could that be because they are all the results of relatively repressive societies? And could that, in turn, be due to the circumstances that all of these famous intellectual styles are the products of countries with imperial traditions? — with upper classes on top of intellectuals (a military and/or landed aristocracy/bureaucracy maintaining relations of dominance both at home and abroad? And, second, if there is something to this, could it be that smaller countries, less hampered by imperial traditions and by internal class contradictions could be at least potentially less repressive and hence develop intellectual styles with a more even balance between proposition production and theory formation, not trying to keep the two apart?

In saying so, I am of course thinking of the Nordic countries, particularly Norway, Sweden and Finland. One may be struck by the prevalence of hypothetical-deductive styles in research and scientific inquiry in general, some kind of balance between induction and deduction.¹⁷ Data inspire theory, theory inspires more data collection, which in turn inspires more theory — this spiralling process is presented and unfolded for the reader who can then follow it step by step and check and test for himself. Whether as a condition or a consequence, this is at least highly compatible with the relatively lower level of repression in these societies. It contrasts with the heavily documented, critical analyses of US society produced by US social scientists,¹⁸ very meagre in theory, and the top-heavy theories produced by the critics of German and French society, more often than not rather thin in documentation.

There is, however, a different approach within the framework of what has been said here if one wants to understand the relative balance in intellectual style among the Viking descendants in northern Europe: the idea of the *cross-beam* alluded to in the first sec-

tion. These countries have been under both saxonian and teutonic influence, and this may have led to both a respect for saxonian data gathering and documentation and for teutonic speculation and theory formation, and has produced attempts to put the two together into a viable methodology. Of the gallic style there is very little: no one could possibly accuse Nordic social scientists of levels of elegance approximating the most brilliant of the French! On the contrary, Nordic authors write a legible journalistic prose and in this genre they might easily outdo their French colleagues. But then the French do not expect to be read by people in general; Nordic social scientists do — or at least entertain the hope. Nor are the Nordic social scientists so concerned with intellectual commentary: what they read about such things will generally not be mentioned in verbal discourse but kept in the background, in the memory, as something against which to check one's own approach. What one tries to do is to make data and theory hang together in a respectably forged chain of words.

But why should this not also be the case of the Netherlands? Here our contention would be that the Dutch are exposed not only to saxonian and teutonic influences but also to gallic, and that to be under the crossfire of three intellectual styles is simply too much. By the time a polyglot Dutch social scientist has come to grips with the literature of all three (remembering that the saxonian stands both for the UK and the US variants!) whatever original inclination he might have had has probably been effectively killed. At that point one would probably have to either seek refuge in one of the cultures alone, undergoing a process of self-colonization or else become a bibliographer, a master of intellectual commentary.³⁹ It would almost be a miracle if creative social science flourished under such conditions.

And the same, of course, would be the general hypothesis for periphery intellectual cultures. Their major concern would be talented imitation, being up-to-date, having the latest news about what happens in the centre. From Brussels to Geneva and down to Rome, Madrid and Lisbon and across the Atlantic to many of the South American countries, social scientists will sleep with their heads pointing towards Paris. . . . Their annual or bi-annual pilgrimage will be the vital way of recharging the batteries. Insights of real value can be expressed in no less a tongue than French; a nod of acceptance from the centre would be the key sign of approval to bring home. The relation between centre and periphery

within one intellectual culture becomes like the relation between a brilliant star and the sink-holes astronomers talk about: the former only radiates, emits; the latter only absorbs, receives. There are people who are like that, those who only send out and never receive anything and those who only receive and never send out anything. The centre-periphery gradient is an institutionalization of that phenomenon. As in linguistic systems, changes in intellectual cultures will probably have to take place in the centre or very near the centre to become real. If they take place at the periphery they will not be considered as "innovations" but be put down as "mistakes", unless there is exceptional power and initiative and charisma behind them.

However, for the periphery of the periphery the situation is not so dark. I feel I have often observed more creativity at periphery universities of periphery countries in an intellectual culture than at provincial universities in the centre country itself, or at universities in the capital of the periphery country. The reason is simple: the last two categories are too busy imitating and being up-to-date to have time or consideration for anything else; the periphery of the periphery may look in other directions and not feel under any obligation to imitate an imitation. They may escape from the stuffiness and stolid behaviour that are the perennial consequences of excessive imitation into some truly innovative behaviour. If such intellectual communities tie up with each other in horizontal networks and a pluralistic spirit of mutual tolerance and coexistence something very creative could probably come out of it. Needless to say this would be resented by the centre of the centre out to get proselytes and wrongly thinking that the periphery of the periphery will fall as soon as the periphery itself is conquered.

In conclusion it should only be added that the last generation has given a formidable tool of dominance to the centre of intellectual styles focusing on proposition production: and this is a *highly industrialized mode of intellectual production*.⁴⁰ I am thinking of massive data collection by big and well-funded teams, and its processing and analysis by impressive but also expensive computers; all of this surrounded by "think tanks", libraries, expensive gatherings and meetings, and so on. There is little doubt that this mode of production is particularly compatible with the saxonian style; so far computers have not been able to reproduce what a good teutonic intellectual can do by way of pyramid construction, not to mention what a good gallic intellectual can do in his exercise on the

borderline between art and science. The latter two are more compatible with an artisanal mode of intellectual production, doing the work at home in one's own living-room, surrounded by books. The saxonian intellectual style will tend to crop up where the computers penetrate; the means of production to a large extent conditioning the mode of production. Even in the heartland of Teutonia and Gallia computers will find their place and generate myriads of data in search of more interpretation than the theory classes of these countries would ever be able to produce. As a consequence data-oriented sub-cultures will emerge, probably as detached from theory formation as the theoreticians are from proposition production, giving to the entire intellectual system a somewhat schizophrenic character. What comes out of this in the long term remains to be seen; but it may be a saxonian Trojan horse.

4. Conclusion: are we heading for a world intellectual style?

I don't think so. There is enough cultural variety in the world, some of it carried by languages of very different kinds, and there is enough diversity in structural positions both among and within countries to ensure differences in intellectual style if there is anything at all to the reasoning in the preceding sections. As classes and countries go up and down, so too will their intellectual styles — with lags and leads, conditioned by circumstances. Some of this will be due to their structural position, some of it to the changes in culture brought about by their new objective position, most of it to the combined effect of the two. Thus, what are here called the saxonian, teutonic and gallic styles will not be tied to particular groups in particular countries but can be seen as something on the move, changing geographical and social position as history moves on; one more reason for using those terms rather than national labels.

There are, however, two phenomena that nevertheless might make one think in terms of a world intellectual style: the linkage between saxonian intellectual style and the industrial mode of intellectual production on the one hand, and the way in which the saxonian intellectual style fits the exigences of the United Nations system in particular and the system of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations on the other (see Rittberger and Galtung, 1981). It is easy to see why the

saxonian style, rich in documentation and very meagre in theory, rich in formal language and poor in elegance should be the language of the secretariats of the UN and the UN agencies: the member states are equal, there is a need if not for consensus at least for a basis on which gentlemen can argue. The saxonian intellectual style produces such a basis. At the same time it reinforces the distinction between the professionals of the secretariat and the outside consultants on the one hand delivering the raw material for the debate — and the governing bodies, including the General Assembly on the other, coming in on top of this material, picking what they want, putting it into their various thought systems with the built-in polarizations produced by the sharp contradictions of the world system. Although they may behave like teutonic and/or gallic intellectuals, the point is that the organizations as such should not have these behavioural patterns built into the secretariat — or at least so it seems.

* * *

But all that is on the surface of the world. Underneath the styles will live on: the teutons will continue to be irritated when the gauls become too lyrical, for instance when they change one word for another with the same meaning in order to obtain some stylistic variation or euphonic effect; and the gauls will continue to be bored by teutonic pedantry. Both of them will be grasping for perspectives and forms of understanding that will put some order into the untidy saxonian landscape of stubborn facts, and the saxons will continue to get restless when the teutons and the gauls speed off into outer space, leaving a thin trail of data behind. Some of them will learn from the others what they do not master themselves, but by and large what is the virtue of one will continue to be the vice of the other. Obviously there are stronger forces than methodology text books with their claims to universal validity at work. And that is all to the good: it would be dreadful if the entire human intellectual enterprise were to be guided by the same intellectual style.

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Notes

1. This paper appeared in *Social Science Information* 5 (3), 1966, pp. 7-33. A Spanish version was published in *Revista Latino Americana de Sociologia* 1(1), 1965, pp. 72-101. See also the critique by J. Graciarena (1965) in the same journal.

2. In short, intellectuals do *work*; we *process*. But that means that the material and social conditions under which this work is done become a major factor in conditioning the output. One example would be the difference between artisanal and industrial modes of intellectual production, between the intellectual essentially working alone and intellectuals working together in "factories" with (usually) sharp division of labour — think tanks, universities, academies. This theme is developed in a paper prepared for the GPID project (Galtung, 1980). Also, see S. H. Alatas (1977) for a succinct analysis of the situation of intellectuals in many developing countries.

3. For an exploration of the relation between social structure and the criteria of truth see "Social structure and science structure", chapter 1, pp. 13-40 in *Methodology and ideology*.

4. It would have been useful if Kant had explored more his own limitations in exploring the limitations of the human mind — not "his" in a personal sense, but "his" as a part of a nation, a class, a tradition, a civilization of what not. But that was not an age of comparative studies, pitting one civilization against the other in a symmetric way.

5. This, of course is the reason why journalism, like research, is supposed to identify the sources: the reader is entitled to evaluate the credibility.

6. Toynbee uses such terms, but I am not trying to hide behind him. The reason is, as stated, to avoid too strong identification with countries.

7. Thus, in the exploration of cosmologies (Galtung, 1981) references are totally missing to Amerindian, African and Pacific civilizations, because of the author's ignorance (and, perhaps, distrust of western anthropologists).

8. One reason for this, of course, is that those who have struggled in their early, formative years to acquire an intellectual style so as to be accepted as a member of a community would not easily give that up — and certainly not tend to see it as an impediment rather than as an instrument of liberation. But intellectual style is located at a level deeper than language: it may survive the transition from working in a European language to working in an African language, at least for some time.

9. This is developed in more detail in my "In defense of epistemological eclecticism" (1980a).

10. Thus, my book, *Theory and methods of social research*, is subdivided that way.

11. For an effort to build a bridge between empiricist, critical, constructive and pragmatic aspects of scientific activity, see "Empiricism, criticism, constructivism: Three aspects of scientific activity", chapter 3, pp. 41-71: in *Methodology and ideology*.

12. Thus the opening phrase in the gallic style discussion may very well be "je ne suis pas d'accord"; in the teutonic style "Sie haben nicht erwähnt...". On the other hand, it should be pointed out that in both styles merely to be found worthy of being listened to and even commented upon is already something, an honour so high that courtesy becomes less than necessary.

13. These two types may be linked to Confucianism and mahayana Buddhism respectively.

14. Both of them are empirical approaches, but whereas the UK approach would assemble a wealth of insight on selected, limited areas of inquiry, the US approach would be more extensive, handle more units of analysis with less (but comparable) information on as many of them as possible. (This distinction is explored in *Theory and methods of social research*, chapter 1.1.2.) Essentially it is the old distinction between ideographic and nomothetic approaches.

15. There are actually almost no theories of anything beyond the middle range in, for instance, US sociology — perhaps with the exception of Parsons (unless one sees this type of work more as taxonomic exercises than as theory). Perspectives from higher altitudes are usually imported, from Europe (e.g. in the wave of brilliant Jewish refugees, perhaps usually with a teutonic bent, but able to adapt to the local intellectual culture) and also from Latin America (*dependencia* theory).

16. This is developed further in "Social structure and science structure," chapter 1 in *Papers on methodology*.

17. In other words, the hypothesis would be that mathematical economics in a predominantly saxon culture will be more like an island, isolated intellectually from commercial colleges and business schools with a more data-oriented approach. Institutionally it might also be isolated in planning sections of ministries, embedded in a political culture with a more teutonic bent — i.e. with Marxist leanings, as in the Nordic countries.

18. *May* tend — it could also be a game in its own right, isolated from other aspects of human activity, including intellectual activity — although such perfect compartmentalization would usually not be easily maintained. Maybe that can only occur in a class, even a caste society. Thus Ogura Kinnoyuki, in his "Arithmetic in a Class Society" (1974) says: "Churchly arithmetic based on Boethius' theory of numbers did not include methods of calculation. Using Indian symbols, it had virtually no relation to daily life, and stressed the occult significance of numbers. In contrast to this the arithmetic of the bourgeoisie consisted mainly of calculations using Indian symbols, and stressed commercial applications." Thus much work was devoted to the theory of perfect numbers, integers equal to the sum of divisors (e.g. $6 = 1 + 2 + 3$) because they "witnessed to the wisdom of the Creator of the universe" (p. 22).

19. This is a British (Saxonic?) reaction — full of admiration — to one of the gallic masters, taken from a review of Michel Foucault's *Surveiller et punir* (Gallimard, Paris, 1975) in the *Times Literary Supplement* 26 September 1975: "This book displays once again all the distinctive Foucault traits — a remarkable use of images; an acute sense of paradox and ambiguity; a fondness for inversion; a relentless pursuit of the multiplicity of human experience; such compelling lucidity

in critical passages that the reader cannot resist persuasion and yet exasperating withdrawal into a vocabulary hermetic to the uninitiated, together with moments of undeniable self-indulgence." And the reviewer gives an example of "one of Foucault's neat inversions, *the soul has become the prison of the body*" (p. 1090 — my italics).

20. The structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss is to me an example of this. The basic equation, $a:b :: x:y$ (a relates to b as x relates to y) is not an axiom from which strict deductions are made (thus, it is not like André Weil's (1949) famous mathematization of kinship relations). Rather, the two relations, $a:b$ and $x:y$, are the two pylons referred to, and the reasoning is suspended between the two, woven into a pattern of dense, and highly elegant, reasoning.

21. This is also well reflected in the very different behaviour of US, UK, French and German students, not to mention Japanese, in classrooms: the US students are highly participatory, asking for the floor, UK, French and German students much more concerned with whether they really have something worth saying. This is reflected in the attitude of the US professor, concerned with the slow and the low among students — perhaps even addressing himself to the non-academic world, the whole community. His French and German colleagues would certainly not do that; they are addressing the best among the students, their colleagues, ultimately merely themselves. The Japanese professors are also operating in closed systems, and the extreme verticality of the systems makes for low levels of general participation and high levels of a one-way, recipient mentality. There is a high level of participation in tertiary education, but then that tertiary education is itself so stratified in castes and classes, among universities and within, that the US participatory effect (particularly as one moves west) is not produced. I am indebted to the discussion at the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* for some of these observations, in particular to Catherine Ballé and Edmund Leites.

22. For an analysis of much of this, see *Le Mal Français* by Alain Peyrefitte — a book written very much in the gallic style by another master — particularly chapter 31, "Le cloisonnement", with such sub-sections as "Ils sont tous directeurs" (pp. 312-26).

23. The classical example being the indivisibility of *artha, dharma, kama* and *moksha*.

24. I am indebted to Hakan Wiberg for the following joke: "Einstein at the Bern railway station, inquiring about trains to Zürich would not ask 'does this train stop in Zürich', but 'does Zürich stop at this train'." Again it is the same story: the tension between two statements is what produces insight, and Buddhist literature is very rich in this, based precisely on the principle of counter-position. One of these sentences, even that put in Einstein's mouth, does not alone carry sufficient insight.

25. This is put very well in Fernando M. Besabe, S. J., *Japanese religious attitudes* (Maryknoll, NY, 1972), p. 87: "... Japanese authors state that the essential difference between Western man and the Japanese lies in the fact that the former always raises in himself the question 'this or that'? (*ara ka kore ka*), whereas the Japanese fails to understand the meaning of such a dualism and will always repeat to himself 'this and that too' (*are mo kore mo*). But theories are there in order to sort and sift, the valid from the invalid, the true from the false, in other words, to establish a line between this and that.

26. The OECD report *Social science policy: Japan* (1977), gives a highly negative picture of the state of the social sciences in Japan, with such unkind remarks as:

Life-time employment has certain implications for the university system. One consequence is that there is a great deal of inbreeding which is normally accepted as a necessary element in the training of a successor by a senior professor. At the same time, acceptance of this tradition means that one often hesitates "rocking the boat" by bringing in new ideas or approaches into the university system, thus slowing the process of change. (p. 114)

... many scholarly essays make no distinction between political ideology and academic objectivity. Frequently social science research is conducted only through a study of the literature, or it is undertaken to introduce or to translate foreign social science texts and materials. (p. 115)

... there are additional reasons for the lethargy of members of social science faculties: too many seem to lack a vision of just what the social sciences are or can become. They are, themselves, in too many instances inadequately trained. (p. 135)

And so on, and so forth. The OECD examiners, in my view, have failed to grasp the cultural specificity of Japanese social science: the Japanese may be interested in something different from what is on the examiners' mind. Thus, the first and the third quotes refer to the primacy of the *iemoto* tradition over the individualistic, competitive western tradition with universalist pretensions. And the second quote refers to the importance accorded to having enough material for adequate classification of the work of others. But I am not denying that the examiners are also right from their ethnocentric saxonian perspective.

27. In the essay on teutonic intellectual style (Galtung, 1979), twelve items are given in "a first guide to teutonic intellectual style" (pp. 195-97). Sample items:

5. Much work goes into issuing certificates classifying other systems, articles, books, authors, groups, schools, etc. A certificate, once issued, is rarely withdrawn. Denials of their validity, as well as acceptance, are seen as irrelevant; the outgroup cannot be a judge in such matters. Their judgement will only reflect their basic mistakes.

11. Discussions do not take the form of dialogue (or multilogues), but rather the form of parallel monologues, like tests of strength serving self-confirmation rather than a common search for something new. Very little exchange, not to mention learning, will take place across system borders.

12. The general style of discourse is serious and humourless; jokes are considered frivolous and indicative of lack of faith in what one says.

28. Very fundamental in the early formation of Japanese social science, though, was the importation of German jurisprudence, which tended to give a double impetus in the direction of the teutonic style, particularly as it was launched in the centre of the structure, at Tōdai. But the all-Japanese setting is increasing in significance not the least due to the homogenizing influence of the central government agencies.

29. Thus, North American social scientists seem particularly prone to think that what they do is universal social science, "economics" as such, not "US economics", coloured by the structural position of the US in the world (and of US economists in the US), and by the peculiar cultural assumptions of the US in general and its élites in particular.

30. The difficulty in getting Marxists to present Marxism in a way that would make it subject to such empirical tests that conclusions of the type "not 100% valid, only X%" are not so different from the difficulties in getting liberals to work "exploitation" into their theoretical frameworks.

31. For another approach in this field, the organization of thought, see H. Leisegang, *Denkformen* (1951). He operates with four forms: the circle, the circle of circles, the pyramid, and Euclidean geometry — very much based on thinkers in western antiquity. S. Takdir Alisjahbana, in his *Values as integrating forces in personality, society and culture* (1966), formulates Leisegang's approach as follows: "In Leisegang's view *Denkform*, which is derived from reality, leads unavoidably to a world view, since in accord with one *Denkform* objects and events are logically related which would not be lawfully related according to other *Denkformen*, without easily detectable inconsistency and disturbing the logical conscience" (p. 208). The word "logical" in this passage, however, is probably too strong if it refers to Aristotelian logic, the word "conscience" being more appropriate. The *Denkform* itself constitutes the sense of what is related and how.

32. For the distinction between intellectuals and intelligentsia, see the paper "On the rise of intellectuals as a class" (Galtung, 1980b).

33. I see this as a source of explanation, and a major one, behind the points quoted in note 27. More particularly, one function of the strict division into schools is to make the arguments exogenous to one's own school irrelevant, hence reducing the risk of falsification.

34. The way this is expressed in "Deductive thinking and political practice" (Galtung, 1979): "...there is a fundamental isomorphism between deduction and causation; prime variables or factors are also prime movers...the arrows of inference become arrows of causation. For this to work out, social reality has to be as strongly coupled empirically as a deductive system is logically" (p. 201).

35. Ashis Nandy has pointed out to me that it might be fruitful to make a distinction between brahmanic and sudraic intellectual styles; the former being more esoteric the latter more down-to-earth, something like the distinctions made in note 18 above. Again, however, the tremendous force of the élites, the extent to which "the dominant intellectual style is the intellectual style of the dominant classes" (to paraphrase Marx) should be kept in mind.

36. One is reminded of the goal of the Vienna circle before the second world war, expressing itself in the many efforts towards "unified science", written in the language of Rudolf Carnap, bringing in specialists in all kinds of fields (the *International encyclopedia of unified science*).

37. A key proponent of this in the Nordic countries has been Arne Naess, highly influential through his advanced work in philosophy of science and methodology as well as through his textbooks for propedeutic courses in philosophy. His whole approach is characterized by an effort to balance induction and deduction in a spiral-like hypothetico-deductive process.

38. Actually, the style used by a US social scientist when engaged in critical analysis is very similar to the style a journalist, or for that matter people in general would use. This very paper was even triggered off by a remark once made in the US by a US housewife who was collecting some recipes: "I am going to the library tomorrow to do a little research on these recipes". A German or French housewife would hardly have used such expressions for that type of activity; in their societies the distance between everyday thinking and scientific thinking being considerably

higher, even discontinuous: two separate worlds, with intellectuals having monopoly on intellectual work.

39. See F. Bovenkerk, "Sociologie in Nederland deugt niet" (1981), a review of Maurice Punch, "Dutch sociology and university reform" (*Sociale Wetenschappen* 24 (1), 1981). He is quoting, in an effort to explain the "deplorable state of affairs" the memoirs of the Spanish diplomat, the Duke of Buena, to the effect that the Dutch are "the most conservative people in the world" and that they "display the mentality of an accountant". Maybe, but the approach I take in trying to account for the lack of originality in Dutch social science is a different one.

40. See note 2 above.

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